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Figure 1: Abstract or representational? The left image in a) and b) shows an indeterminate painting, whereas the right image in a) and b)
shows a representational painting with seemingly similar image content.
Abstract
The question of how humans perceive art and how the sensory per-
cept is endowed with aesthetics by the human brain has continued
to fascinate psychologists and artists alike. It seems, for example,
rather easy for us to classify a work of art as either “abstract” or
“representational”. The artist Robert Pepperell recently has pro-
duced a series of paintings that seek to defy this classification: his
goal was to convey “indeterminancy” in these paintings - scenes
that at first glance look like they contain an object or belong to a
certain genre but that upon closer examination escape a definite de-
termination of their contents. Here, we report results from several
psychophysical experiments using these artworks as stimuli, which
seek to shed light on the perceptual processing of the degree of ab-
straction in images. More specifically, the task in these experiments
was to categorize a briefly shown image as “abstract” or “represen-
tational”. Stimuli included Pepperell’s paintings each of which was
paired with a similar representational work of art from several pe-
riods and several artistic genres. The results provide insights into
the visual processes determining our perception of art and can also
function as a “objective” validation for the intentions of the artist.
CR Categories: J.5 [Computer Application]: Arts and
Humanities—Fine arts; J.4 [Computer Application]: Social and Be-
havioural Sciences—Psychology;
Keywords: perception of art, categorization, psychophysics, per-
ceptual graphics
1 Introduction
Perception and processing of our surroundings seem to be so ef-
fortless and easy that we rarely pay attention to how we see. Our
brain, however, has to process, combine and separate shapes, col-
ors, shadows, object relations, and much more within fractions of a
second in order to build a coherent representation from sensory in-
put - it is only this representation that allows us to interact with our
environment. Visual illusions demonstrate that this process of in-
terpretation often does not correspond to physical reality, but rather
that perception critically depends on heuristics, or, more generally,
prior knowledge. It is this realization of the truth of “perceptual
reality” that underlies the works of the artist Robert Pepperell. Us-
ing different techniques, he tries to create works of art that evoke the
impression of “something” but that at a closer look escape a definite
interpretation of what that “something” consists of (see Figure 1).
This type of “indeterminate” art is made possible by playing with
visual features that are perceptually important for object and scene
interpretations - shapes that seem to consist of coherent patches and
fragments of color, but that stop just short of defining the object or
scene completely.
Pepperell’s interest in “indeterminate” art arose from viewing a
scene in an expressionist movie (Robert Wienes ’The Cabinet of
Dr. Caligari’ (1919)) whose visual content could for a short time
not be interpreted fully - stayed indeterminate: “I was no longer a
passive consumer of meaning, but an active producer, drawing on
all my latent cognitive resources to recover the lost sense of co-
herence...” [Pepperell 2005]. Following this realization, Pepperell
started to work on producing art that captures this moment of inde-
terminacy: “When trying to construct such images I soon realized
the difficulties inherent in balancing the right amount of meaning-
fulness and meaninglessness so as to create the desired indetermi-
nate effect. If it was too meaningless then it attracted no interest at
all; if it was too meaningful then there was no anxiety about the de-
piction and, hence, no effect of the kind I was seeking.” [Pepperell
2005] He goes so far as to say that “The world itself contains no ob-
jects [...] the world out there is simply a unitary mass of potential
objects that, with the right apparatus, can be perceived as separate,
bounded things.”[Pepperell 2005]
Pepperell’s art in a way occupies the middle ground between “ab-
stract” and “representational” art - wavering between being devoid
of meaning and determining a clear genre and image content. In
this paper, we want to look at Pepperell’s art with the tools of a
perception scientist - more specifically, we are interested in how
we process indeterminate art and whether categories such as “ab-
stract” and “representational” are categories that are available per-
ceptually. We will shed light on how we perceive indeterminate art
and in doing so also provide a perceptual validation of Pepperell’s
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Figure 2: The connection between art, perception, and
visualization using the two parameter dimensions of “ab-
stract”/“representational” and “unique”/“ambiguous”.
artistic intentions, as we will be able to determine for each painting
whether it succeeded in wavering between “abstract” and “repre-
sentational”. At the same time, Pepperell’s paintings give us as
perception scientists a unique set of stimuli with which we can test
and probe the processes underlying scene categorization by con-
straining and determining, for example, which features give rise to
visually well-defined objects and scenes.
Going beyond a connection between art and perception research,
it is perhaps interesting in this context to take a look at visualiza-
tion or information design: An effective visualization, for example,
needs to be as clearly and uniquely interpretable as possible. The
creation of effective visualizations can therefore be aided by look-
ing at perceptual processes: “[...] information design must actively
encourage and participate in research that increases our understand-
ing of information and the effect that it has: how and why people
respond to information, how the human brain processes information
and builds knowledge, as well as how humans organize knowledge
and convert it into improved behavior and operation. Better under-
standing of these factors will enable us to create the best possible
information, interfaces and communications.” [Knemeyer 2003].
The connection between these topics is illustrated by Fig. 2 which
represents a schematic space consisting of two broad interpreta-
tion dimensions (abstract/representational and unique/ambiguous),
as well as two broad instantiation layers of visual information (in-
formation can be interpreted at the higher, conceptual layer and
the lower, perceptual layer). For each of the extremes in this two-
dimensional space and for each layer, we have indicated “typical”
applications - for example, on the perceptual layer the goal of ob-
ject recognition as a fundamental process of our visual system is to
unambiguously interpret real-world objects; the equivalent on the
conceptual layer is given by photography or photo-realism in com-
puter graphics which are concerned with an accurate depiction of
the physical world.
It is obvious that the conceptual layer is always dependent on and
defined by the perceptual layer showing that one needs to inte-
grate both levels for information design/visualization and, for ex-
ample, indeterminate art. On the conceptual layer, the parameters of
abstract/representational and unique/ambiguous allow the assign-
ments of different visual rendering techniques as well as their un-
derlying perceptual equivalents. The uniqueness that is intended in
information design and visualization is illustrated by its positioning
on the left of the diagram. Pepperell’s art, however, needs to be
found in the ambiguous domain of this scale. Fig. 2 shows that per-
ception can quickly lose its degree of uniqueness and that this can
be used on the conceptual level by, for example, abstract, cubist,
surrealist, or indeterminate art: the dissolution of perspective laws,
the loss of shape- and color-information, as well as the presenta-
tion in different contexts all render images more ambiguous. In
contrast, photography needs to be clearer in its message, similarly
to information design, as “[...] information only has value when it
is successfully communicated. If it cannot be accessed or under-
stood it does not have value.” [Knemeyer 2003]. Information de-
sign and visualization, in comparison to photography, try to convey
complex, sometimes highly abstracted information therefore plac-
ing these disciplines firmly in the abstract and unique domain.
2 Related Work
There have been numerous studies that have looked at the per-
ception of art, with approaches ranging from neurophysiology
[Zeki 1999], to behavioural studies using eyetracking [Buswell
1935; Yarbus 1967], to higher-level perceptual discussions [Arn-
heim 1974; Fourquet et al. 2006]. To our knowledge, however,
there have been no studies that have investigated works of art us-
ing psychophysical methods which try to establish a more rigor-
ous description of the visual features that drive perception of these
works. Here, we were interested in exploring the indeterminate art
by Robert Pepperell in comparison to selected representational art
from such a psychophysical point of view.
In the following, we will discuss two perceptual experiments that
look at
• Q1: the distribution of categorical decisions between “ab-
stract” and “representational” for quickly presented images of
Pepperell’s art and representational art
• Q2: how fast it takes to make this decision
• Q3: whether we process both types of art independently of
their image orientation
• Q4: how the pattern of responses changes as a function of
image size
The motivations for addressing these specific research questions
arose from research in scene categorization and object recognition:
• ad Q1: It is known that humans can decide extremely quickly
and accurately whether a scene contains an animal [Thorpe
et al. 1996]; similarly, the gist of a scene is available to us by
just taking a quick glance at a picture [Potter 1975; Biederman
et al. 1981]. Can we also use “high-level” categories such as
“abstract” and “representational” in such a context?
• ad Q2: Connected to the previous question: does the pro-
cessing of clearly defined image contents take as long as the
processing of indeterminate features in Pepperell’s works?
• ad Q3: Numerous studies have demonstrated that perception
is critically dependent on stimulus transformations (see, for
example, the discussion on view-based recognition in the ob-
ject recognition literature [Tarr and Bu¨lthoff 1999], or the face
inversion effect [Yin 1969]). By presenting indeterminate and
representational art in different image orientations, we hope to
get insight into whether the processing of these two categories
is driven by low-level, highly orientation-independent fea-
tures, or rather higher-level, orientation-dependent features.
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Figure 3: Category responses as a function of a) category and orientation. Reaction times as a function of b) category, c) orientation.
• ad Q4: Similarly, the question of scale is important in vi-
sual processing: face detection, for example, using only low-
frequency information is better in the context of a scene than
without this context [Lewis and Edmonds 2003]. It will be in-
teresting to see, how we process these high-level concepts of
“abstract” and “representational”, as a function of image size
as this determines the critical spatial frequencies for this task.
3 Experiment 1
In this experiment, we addressed questions Q1-Q3 using 60 art-
works from Robert Pepperell (some examples are shown in Figs.
6,7,8) and 60 representational artworks. The latter were selected
by Robert Pepperell as they could be seen as representional coun-
terparts to or inspiration for his art. They were by different artists
and represented rather different genres and styles. All images were
converted to greyscale - therefore, in the following experiments, we
explicitly do not address the role of color in the perception of art.
3.1 Methods and Design
Fifteen participants were shown 60 images of indeterminate art and
60 images of representational art. In order to address the role of
image orientation images were shown three times in the correct
(right-side-up, RSU) orientation and three times rotated by 180◦
(upside-down, USD) yielding a total of 720 trials. Images were
shown on a monitor at a resolution of 1024x768 pixels which par-
ticipants viewed from a distance of 50cm while resting their head
on a chin rest. As the paintings were of different formats, image
size varied accordingly from 500x500 pixels to 700x600 pixels - on
average, images subtended ≈ 20◦x20◦ of visual angle. Each trial
started with a fixation cross that was displayed for 100 ms, after
this an image was displayed for 120 ms, followed by a blank period
of 300ms. Starting with the image presentation, participants had to
answer using two keys, whether the image was “abstract” or “rep-
resentational” - they were told to do this as quickly as possible and
the time from image onset to keypress was recorded as their reaction
time. Participants were briefed before the experiments about those
two categories and no participant had any problems with these con-
cepts. This task can be seen as probing the abstract/representational
interpretation dimension depicted in Fig. 2 for Pepperell’s art.
3.2 Analysis
Analysis of the results was done by subjecting the variables cat-
egory response and reaction time to an analysis of variance with
factors category and orientation. For category response, we found
main effects of category (F(1,14)=7.572, p<0.05) and orientation
(F(1,14)=11.321, p<0.01) as well as a highly significant interac-
tion between category and orientation (F(1,14)=16.371, p<0.001).
For reaction time, we found effects of category (F(1,14)=10.758,
p<0.01) and orientation (F(1,14)=10.633, p<0.01).
3.2.1 Categorization
The results for category response are plotted in Fig. 3a as the per-
centage of trials in which participants responded that a particular
image would belong to the representational category.
Category: The category describes the two types of art - indetermi-
nate art versus representational art. The analysis shows that overall,
63% of the participants labelled Pepperell’s images as “abstract” -
meaning that 37% saw a known object or scene in those images.
This result already tells us that Pepperell’s intentions of indetermi-
nacy have largely been achieved in his images - ideally, of course,
the result would have been 50%. We will discuss these results in
more detail below for some individual images. In contrast, repre-
sentational images were categorized as such in 85% of the cases
- a much more unambiguous, but still not perfect categorization
result. Nevertheless, especially this latter result shows that partici-
pants are, indeed, capable of reliably assigning high-level concepts
to briefly shown images. This demonstrates that going beyond the
scene gist, higher-level concepts may be accessible already at a very
early stage in the perceptual process.
Category/Orientation: The comparison of right-side-up versus
upside-down images shows that representational images were sig-
nificantly better recognized as such in the upright condition (88%
versus 82%, (p<0.01)). This result provides further evidence for
the theory that we process scenes as configurations of objects,
and that these configurational processes are critically dependent on
viewing direction (see also [Vogel et al. 2006] for further studies
on configurational processing of real-world scenes). Conversely,
the lack of an orientation effect for indeterminate art might suggest
that either those images are not processed on an object level but
rather more globally, or that these types of images do lack a defined
image composition with clear directionalities and image relations.
Single Images: Looking at performance for single images, we see a
more refined pattern: out of 60 images, 44 representational images
were recognized equally well in both orientations (see Figs. 6a,b for
two examples) - it was never the case, however, that an upside-down
image was recognized better than a right-side-up image. Interest-
ingly, several of the images, for which no effect of inversion was
found, depicted ceiling frescos (such as shown in Fig. 6a,b) which
show human figures in various arrangements containing faces in all
orientations. This would make it much easier for the human visual
system - which is known to be orientation sensitive for detection
[Lewis and Edmonds 2003] and recognition [Wallraven et al. 2002]
of faces - to analyze these images despite a change in orientation.
A significant inversion effect could be found for 16 representational
images. It is interesting that in this case, the images predominately
contain low special frequencies resulting in a slightly blurred, un-
focussed look (see Figs. 6c,d for two examples). In Fig. 6d, for
example, one can recognize stairs in the left side of the image. By
using the prior that light in natural scenes comes from above [Brew-
ster 1826], the pattern of light and dark makes features, which in
isolation would be rather obscure, more easily interpretable. Turn-
ing this image upside down, this interpretation suddenly becomes
much harder due to the apparently random distribution of light and
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shadows in the scene thus resulting in a more abstract impression.
For Pepperell’s images, the two images that were classified as being
most “representational” are shown in Figs. 6e,f (scores for these
images were 86% and 76%, respectively). Looking more closely
at these images, Fig. 6e might depict a reclining figure on a dais
whereas Fig. 6f might depict a bedouin figure in an oriental bazaar
scene. Both images share a very clear delineation of shapes with
relatively sharp boundaries and high-frequency information. The
images with the highest number of “abstract” votes are shown in
Fig. 6g,h (scores for these images were 3% and 5%, respectively).
These two paintings (as well as several other very “abstract” ones)
consist mostly of blurred, unfocussed shapes with few - if any - co-
herent regions that could be identified as objects. Interestingly, Fig.
6h also shows a very clear inversion effect in that it is categorized
as significantly more representational in the upside-down condition.
This shows that this image (as well as two other of Pepperell’s art-
works which we tested) seem to contain a configuration of image
features that appears more well-defined in the inverse orientation.
Image 22 shows an inversion effect in that it is classified as more
“abstract” when turned upside-down (a change from 52% to 70%)
- here, Pepperell seems to leave his intended domain of indetermi-
nate art. This image (as well as 6 additional images for which this
effect could be found) contains two parts: a relatively busy, high-
contrast region compared to a quiet, low-contrast region. This latter
region could be interpreted as background and/or sky. The shapes
on the opposite side therefore need to specify the lower part of the
image - again, our prior knowledge tells us that objects are usually
on the ground with light shining on them from above. This defined
orientation seems to enable a more representational interpretation
of the image therefore leading to an inversion effect.
3.2.2 Reaction Time
The results for category response are shown in Figs. 3b,c.
Category: Participants were consistently faster to categorize repre-
sentational images than they were for indeterminate art. One expla-
nation for this might be that participants use specific search strate-
gies for this task - the search for known objects in the scene, for
example, in Pepperell’s images by intention would be unsuccessful
therefore leading to longer reaction times. This result is especially
interesting in the context of the category responses discussed above:
if the strategy for participants in the categorization task would sim-
ply be to look for “blurred” images and classify those as “abstract”
then one would presumably find a much faster reaction time for
these images, as low spatial frequencies can be processed much
faster (e.g, [Lewis and Edmonds 2003]). As this was not the case,
we can assume that categorization in both cases is driven predom-
inately by the search for known objects and object relations in the
scene - this result agrees with previous studies on scene categoriza-
tion [Biederman et al. 1981; Henderson 2005].
Orientation: Overall, we found that images in the right-side-up
condition were categorized faster than images in the upside-down
condition. This was true for both categories, showing that even
though category response for Pepperell’s images did not depend on
orientation, reaction time did. Again, this result demonstrates that
there seems to be a defined composition of objects or object-like
features in Pepperell’s images and that these are processed differ-
entially depending on orientation.
4 Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we were interested to address the question of scale
(Q4) in the categorization task in order to investigate how the as-
signment of the high-level concepts of “abstract” and “representa-
tional” would depend on image size. For this, we used three dif-
ferent image sizes created by successively reducing the images by
a factor of 2 arriving at three sizes of 1/2 original size, 1/4 origi-
nal size, and 1/8 original size. In addition, all images were shown
only once in those three sizes - again using upside-down and right-
side-up orientations. The task, methods, and design were otherwise
identical to Experiment 1 with another group of 15 participants tak-
ing part in this experiment.
4.1 Analysis
Analysis of the results was done by subjecting the variables cat-
egory response and reaction time to an analysis of variance with
factors category, orientation, and size. For category response, we
found main effects of category (F(1,14)=9.893, p<0.01) and size
(F(2,28)=18.758, p<0.001) as well as a highly significant interac-
tions between category and orientation (F(1,14)=26.292, p<0.001)
and category and size (F(2,28)=15.788, p<0.001). For reaction
time, we also found main effects of category (F(1,14)=10.852,
p<0.01) and orientation (F(1,14)=5.376, p<0.05), as well as an
interaction between category and size (F(2,28)=5.405, p<0.01).
4.1.1 Categorization
Category: The overall difference between indeterminate and rep-
resentational images was much bigger than in the first experiment:
52% of all indeterminate images were categorized as “abstract”,
whereas 77% of all representational images were labelled as such.
Presenting images at smaller scales seemingly has brought Pep-
perell’s art closer to being indeterminate. Similarly, there was a
significant reduction for representational images - again, reducing
image size led to a more abstract percept.
Category/Orientation: Looking at the interaction of category and
orientation for representational artworks, right-side-up images were
categorized as such in 81% as opposed to only 74% of the cases in
the upside-down condition - a significant difference (p<0.01). In
contrast, performance did not change much overall for Pepperell’s
artworks. This result is in accordance with Experiment 1 where we
found the same pattern.
Category/Size: Not surprisingly, the bigger the images, the bet-
ter categorization becomes for representational images rising from
65% for the lowest scale to 81% for the middle scale, to 87% for the
highest scale. Interestingly, the performance for the largest scale in
this experiment was identical to the performance in Experiment 1
(p=0.65, n.s) where the images were twice as large. A further in-
crease in size beyond the scale tested here therefore seems not to
help any further in labelling the images as “representational” - at
larger image sizes, this might also be due to the time it takes to scan
the image using eye movements as retinal image size becomes too
big. Nevertheless, a reduction to a quarter of the original image
size (corresponding to an average image size of 170x170 pixels)
already results in a noticable drop in performance, whereas a re-
duction to an eighth of the original image size (corresponding to
an average image size of 85x85 pixels) has a detrimental effect on
performance suggesting that the critical information for this task is
contained at this spatial frequency range.
For Pepperell’s paintings, the degree of representationality ranges
from 42% to 51% - although there is a tendency for smaller images
to be classified as more “abstract” than large images, this difference
does not reach statistical significance (p>0.05, n.s. for all compar-
isons). Nevertheless, there is a significant difference of the largest
scale in this experiment to be judged as more “abstract” than the
one used in Experiment 1 (45% versus 36%, (p<0.01) collapsed
across orientations). It therefore seems that the scale at which inde-
terminacy is achieved is on average at half the original image size
for the viewing distance used here - at least when defining indeter-
minacy along the dimension of representationality as was done for
these experiments.
Single images: For representational images, the images which ex-
hibited the largest difference across scales are shown in Figs. 7a,b
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Figure 4: Category responses as a function of a) category and orientation, d) category and size.
(the scores across scales were 40%, 80%, 93% for Fig. 7a and 13%,
60%, 80% for Fig 7b). The large increase in performance for both
images for the middle scales almost represents a categorical change
in perception as the image contents become recognizable. Con-
versely, Fig. 7c shows an example from the 20 images for which a
change in scale had almost no effect on categorization performance.
These images usually contain larger objects (such as the human fig-
ures in Fig. 7c) that remain clearly visible even at a much smaller
image scale. Interestingly, comparing and combining the results
for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, we found that representational
images which result in a strong inversion effect (for example, Fig.
6c,d) were also the ones which suffered most from a change in size.
This might hint at a possible interaction between scale and orienta-
tion, which we could, however, not verify due to lack of statistical
power using this data.
For Pepperell’s indeterminate artworks, the interpretation of single
images is much less clear due to the relatively small effect of scale
on the results. For 10 indeterminate paintings out of 60, we found
that they were classified as being more representational with in-
creasing size (Fig 7e with scores of 40%, 67%, 87% and Fig 7f with
scores of 33%, 53%, 80%). These images contained a relatively
large amount of high-frequency content compared to the other inde-
terminate artworks. We could not find clear evidence for the inverse
effect, that is images that were classified as more “abstract” with in-
creasing size. Overall, it therefore seems that we have found a clear
tendency for small image sizes to be judged as more “abstract”.
4.1.2 Reaction Time
Category & Orientation: Similar to Experiment 1, representa-
tional images were categorized faster than indeterminate ones -
right-side-up images were also categorized faster than images in
the upside-down condition. This again supports the assumption that
these images are processed using a search strategy for known ob-
jects and object relations.
Category/Size: Interestingly, for representational images, reaction
times were faster for larger images than for smaller ones. If one as-
sumes a search for objects for a successful classification, then this
search might be easier for the larger scales as objects - such as faces,
human figures or trees - are more clearly identifiable. In contrast,
for indeterminate art reaction times are tendentially faster for the
larger scales than for the smaller ones. Again, assuming a similar
search strategy this can be explained by the fact that larger images
still contain hints of objects (that is, more high-frequency informa-
tion), therefore leading to a longer, yet still largely unsuccessful
search ultimately resulting in longer reaction times.
5 Genre categorization
After a short break, we asked participants for both experiments to
do another task. Using the same experimental setup, we randomly
presented 30 images of indeterminate art in the original size on the
screen and asked participants to categorize each image into one of 6
categories or artistic genres (Biblical scene, Landscape with person,
Landscape without person, Portrait, Stilllife, Battle Scene) or to
indicate a new category. Participants could take as long as they
wanted to make this decision. Our goal here was to see whether
participants would be able to assign a category to an indeterminate
image - again, if Pepperell’s intentions would be true, we would
expect few if any consistent answers in this task. This therefore
task probes the unique/ambiguous dimension on Fig. 2.
5.1 Uniqueness criterion
In order to determine the validity of the categorization reponses
across images, we use a uniqueness criterion that is defined as:
u=
1






that is, for each image, we determine the category with the highest
number of votes vmax and then sum up the differences between this
maximum value and the votes for all n = 6 categories normalizing
by n−1= 5 times the total number of votes. An image with a large
uniqueness criterion has a value of 1, whereas a criterion of 0 would
mean a maximally ambiguous image. Note, that this definition does
not take into account whether participants chose to select a different
category from the 6 given ones - across both experiments, this was
done in 15% of the cases.
In the following, we present the results of this analysis collapsed
across both experiments - there were slight differences between the
two experiments which could, however, still be explained by varia-
tion due to the relative coarseness of the uniqueness measure.
5.2 “Unique” and “Ambiguous”
Fig. 8 shows the three most uniquely and the two most ambigu-
ously classified images according to the uniqueness criterion.
Uniquely categorized images: Fig. 8a was the most uniquely cate-
gorized image with 28 out of 30 participants labelling it as a stilllife.
Looking at the painting, this categorization can clearly be verified -
both the composition as well as single “object” (bananas, an apple)
can be seen in the image. Similarly, Fig. 8b was also classified as a
stilllife by 16 participants (most of the remaining participants saw
flowers in the image); one might say that the image can perhaps
best be interpreted as a painting of a flower stilllife as the broad,
paste-like brush-strokes of this style can be clearly identified in the
image - even if the individual objects cannot. Finally, Fig. 8c was
categorized as a portrait by 21 participants - again, an interpretation
which seems “reasonable” as the image reminds of a painting of a
reclining figure on a dais.
Ambiguously categorized images: Figs. 8d,e seemingly could
not be categorized consistently at all - except for the genre of por-
trait all other genres were named for these three images. Partici-
pants were at least unanimous in that all those images did not con-
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Figure 5: Pepperell’s interpretation space.
tain a close view of a person; interestingly, however, the category
of Landscape containing person(s) was chosen regularly indicating
that there might have been enough information to assume the pres-
ence of human figures in the image. Some of the shapes in Fig. 8d,
for example, might consist of human figures/shadows in the mist.
6 The interpretation space - Conclusions
Coming back to the questions raised in the introduction, we have
found evidence that
• ad Q1: Participants are able to assign high-level concepts
such as “abstract” and “representational” to briefly presented
images. Performance for representational art was around
90% for upright images indicating a very robust processing
pipeline. Indeterminate art was classified as lying on the mid-
dle of the representationality dimension providing initial val-
idation for Pepperell’s artistic intentions.
• ad Q2: The time it makes to do this decision is slightly longer
for indeterminate art than for representational art. This is a
strong indication that this task is solved by a search strategy
looking for known objects and object relations.
• ad Q3: We found a clear impact of orientation on process-
ing of representational art that was in accordance with previ-
ous research on our sensitivity to stimulus transformations in
visual processing. This was even true to some extent for in-
determinate artworks which still contained remnants of stan-
dard image composition techniques (light region above dark
region).
• ad Q4: Finally, we found that processing of the degree of ab-
stractness critically depends on the image size, that is, the spa-
tial frequency content of the images. The smaller the images
were in Experiment 2, the more “abstract” they appeared to
be - again, taking reaction time data into account, this speaks
in favour of a search strategy.
In the following, we sum up our results in the context of the
interpretation space developed in the introduction. By using
the two dimensions of “abstract”-“representational” and “unique”-
“ambiguous” which we measured using the results from the fast
categorization experiment and from the genre catgorization data,
we can assign two coordinates to each image and therefore locate it
in the interpretation space (see Fig. 5).
It is interesting that the images occupy a large part of the interpreta-
tion space - no clear correlation between the two dimensions could
be found indicated by the best-fit score that was non-significant
(r2=0.052, p=0.45, n.s). This result can be seen as a validation
of the concept behind Fig. 2 which locates art, perception and vi-
sualization in this two-dimensional space. As hypothesized ear-
lier, Pepperell’s images, indeed, occupy a region of indeterminacy
mostly lying in the “ambiguous” region and that his images in ad-
dition fall inbetween abstract and representational concepts with a
slight tendency towards the abstract. Following a strict interpre-
tation of this space, the four images marked on the left could be
seen as lying outside of Pepperell’s original intentions as they are
too uniquely determinable along either of the two dimensions. In a
way, these results can therefore be seen as a perceptual validation
of Pepperell’s artistic programme - if only a very crude one.
Further work will be concerned with a better characterization of the
spatial frequency information contained in the images. We inten-
tionally chose not to include this here, as we want to combine this
analysis with a set of eye-tracking experiments that are currently
underway. Taken together, these experiments and analyses aim at
characterizing more rigourously the visual information that is used
in such a categorization task following up on the classic work of
[Buswell 1935; Yarbus 1967]. Finally, we will analyze the role of
color in the perception of both indeterminate and representational
art as well as include truly “abstract” artworks in order to be able to
span “all of the interpretation space”.
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Figure 7: Exp2: a)-c) Examples of representational art, d)-e) examples of indeterminate art by Robert Pepperell.
a) b) c)
d) e)
Figure 8: Genre categorization: The three most a) uniquely and the two most b) ambiguously classified images.
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